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The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal Endangered
Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt
In October 1990, in violation of the Endangered Species Act of
1973,1 North Carolina resident Richard Lee Mann shot a red wolf
that he feared might threaten his cattle.2 He pled guilty to the
offense of illegally taking3 a red wolf, but his prosecution sparked
local opposition to the federal Endangered Species program
protecting red wolves on private land.4 Lending his voice to popular
sentiment, Mr. Mann sued the Secretary of the Interior in federal
court, arguing that Congress exceeded its power under the
Commerce Clause 5 by regulating red wolf populations on intrastate,
non-federal land.6 In Gibbs v. Babbitt, 7 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina upheld Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause to enforce the Endangered
Species Act.8 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision.' This Recent
Development examines the Fourth Circuit's decision in light of the
Supreme Court's renewed interest in the constitutional limits of
Congress's Commerce Clause power.
Modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence began in 193710 with
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (1999)
(categorizing red wolves as a protected "experimental population").
2. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 489 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3552
(U.S. Feb. 20, 2001) (No. 00-844).
3. To "take" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (1994).
4. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489 (noting that several North Carolina counties and towns
passed "resolutions opposing the reintroduction of the wolves"); see also Walter Williams,
Picking Us Off, One at a Time, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Aug. 31, 2000, at 15A (arguing
that Mann's conviction was an abuse of governmental rights in violation of the Fifth
Amendment). But see Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489 (acknowledging that most of the people and
agencies involved supported the red wolf reintroduction program). See generally James
Eli Shiffer, Red-Wolf Renaissance, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 25, 2000, at
1A (describing positive and negative reactions to the red wolf reintroduction).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the Power... To regulate
Commerce ... among the several States.").
6. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
7. 31 F. Supp. 2d 531,535-36 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
8. Id.
9. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2001)
(No. 00-844).
10. Due to its limited scope, this Recent Development does not provide an expansive
history of the Commerce Clause. For a more in depth history, see Chief Justice
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp." In NLRB, the United States
Supreme Court held that activities that "have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions" are within the scope of the Commerce Clause, even if
the activities are intrastate.'2 After the Court's decision in NLRB,
the Commerce Clause was a virtual blank check that Congress could
use to pass almost any legislation.'"
Wickard v. Filburn,4 characterized as "perhaps the most far
reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity,"' 5 illustrates the extent of Congress's regulatory power after
NLRB. In Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulation of
Roscoe Filburn's consumption of home-grown wheat on the theory
that Mr. Filburn's surplus wheat would negate his need to purchase
wheat in interstate commerce. 6 As the Court explained, while one
person's effect upon interstate commerce may not be "substantial,"
Congress may regulate that activity under the Commerce Clause if
the individual's activity "together with that of others similarly
situated" has a substantial economic impact.'
In 1995, almost sixty years after NLRB, the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Lopez 8 substantially altered Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. In Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free
Rehnquist's summary in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,553-58 (1995).
11. 301 U.S. 1, 36-39 (1937) (upholding Congress's authority to regulate employment
practices by preventing employers from refusing to allow employees to collectively
bargain and unionize).
12. Id. at 37 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935)).
13. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 268
(1981) (upholding federal regulation of intrastate coal mining); Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 147 (1971) (upholding federal regulation of intrastate credit extortion); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964) (upholding federal
regulation of a local motel because it catered to interstate guests). Indeed, Judge Alex
Kozinski once characterized the Commerce Clause as the "Hey, you-can-do-whatever-
you-feel-like Clause." Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1995). For a critical summary of Congress's use of the Commerce Clause
to regulate activity traditionally subject to local control, see Grant S. Nelson & Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold
Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 79-88 (1999).
14. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
15. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,560 (1995).
16. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-30.
17. Id. at 127-28.
18. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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School Zones Act of 1990,19 which prohibited possession of a firearm
in a school zone,20 on grounds that the Act exceeded Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause.21 In reaching its decision, the
Court specifically identified three categories of activity that Congress
is constitutionally allowed to regulate under its Commerce Clause
power.' First, Congress may regulate the channels of interstate
commerce.z3  Second, Congress may regulate and protect the
instrumentalities, persons, or things in interstate commerce, even if
the regulated activities are solely intrastate.24 Third, Congress has
the authority to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on or
relation to interstate commerceY Activities falling outside of these
three categories are considered beyond the scope of congressional
authority.26 After concluding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
could only be sustained under the third category, the Court
determined that the Act did not "substantially affect" interstate
commerce and was therefore unconstitutional. 27
Commentators disagreed about the potential reach of Lopez.
Some argued that Lopez marked the genesis of an attempt to revive
federalism principles dormant since 1937.1 Others considered Lopez
19. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994).
20. Id.
21. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
22. lId at 558.
23. Id For example, Congress can regulate the actions of a motel that serves
travelers, no matter how local its business. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241,255-56 (1964).
24. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. For example, Congress can regulate cars and other
vehicles used in interstate commerce. See S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26
(1911).
25. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that "third category" activity must "substantially affect," not simply "affect,"
interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. Observing that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act did not relate to "commerce or any sort of economic enterprise," id. at 561, Chief
Justice Rehnquist rejected the government's "causal chain" economic argument because it
would eliminate any real limits on federal power by piling "inference upon inference" to
take general police power away from the states until the desired result was achieved. Id.
at 564, 567.
26. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving powers not
delegated to the federal government by the Constitution to the states).
27. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
28. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752,752 (1995) (stating
that Lopez "has shattered forever the notion that, after fifty years of Commerce Clause
precedent, we can never go back to the days of limited national power"); Richard A.
Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 167, 168
(1996) ("This one abrupt departure from established practice has turned a safe stronghold
into a new battleground for constitutional litigation.").
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to be nothing more than a warning to Congress not to overstep its
bounds so egregiously in future cases.29 Despite academic attention,
in the years following Lopez, however, the import of the Court's
decision remained uncertain. 0
Five years later, in United States v. Morrison,"' the Supreme
Court confirmed that Lopez in fact marked a dramatic shift in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence when the Court struck down a
section of the Violence Against Women Act of 199432 as beyond
Congress's Commerce Clause authority.33 Focusing solely on the
third Lopez category-activities which substantially affect interstate
commerce-the Court began with the proposition that "[g]ender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity."35 While avoiding establishing a categorical rule
against congressional regulation of non-economic intrastate activity,
the Court acknowledged that congressional authority to regulate such
activity has historically been denied.36  Despite numerous
congressional findings supporting the link between gender-motivated
29. See, e.g., Louis Pollak, Foreword to Symposium, Reflections on United States v.
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533,550 (1995) (arguing that "Lopez will not prove 'epochal' ");
H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH L. REv. 651, 651-
52 (1995) (stating that Lopez will probably be nothing more than a warning to Congress to
support statutes with legislative findings); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the
Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 554, 554 (1995) (arguing that Lopez will not "inaugurate a major change" in the
Court's approach to federal legislation).
30. John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-
Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 176 (1998) (noting the disagreement over "[w]hether
Lopez mark[ed] a dramatic shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence or [was] instead
destined to be a 'but see' citation").
31. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
33. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1745 (invalidating the federal civil remedy for victims of
gender-motivated violence provided by 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
34. The United States conceded that the statute could not be justified under the first
two Lopez categories. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749.
35. IL at 1751. The United States argued that there were congressional findings
"supported by a massive legislative record, compiled over four years of hearings, which
document the impact of violence against women on the national economy and interstate
commerce." Reply Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct.
1740 (2000) (No. 99-5, 99-29). The findings, however, did not go unchallenged. See Brief
of Amicus Curiae of Women's Freedom Network at 1-2, United States v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 1740 (2000) (No. 99-5, 99-29) (arguing that the congressional findings are conclusory
and do not present any real evidence).
36. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751. In contrast, in January 2000, the Court
unanimously affirmed that Congress has the right to regulate the sale of commercial
goods, even if that sale occurs intrastate. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 141 (2000).
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violence and interstate commerce,37 the Morrison Court nonetheless
concluded that Congress had exceeded its constitutional power." In
the Court's words, "the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation. '39  After further reminding Congress that the
Court, not Congress, is the ultimate arbiter of the scope of
congressional authority n° the Court concluded that the legislation's
connection to interstate commerce was too tenuous to be sustained
under the Commerce Clause.
In validating Lopez, the Court clearly indicated its intent to
actively police Congress's exercise of its commerce power. While the
Morrison majority stated that due respect for Congress requires that
the Court only invalidate a law after a "clear showing that Congress
... exceeded its constitutional bounds," 42 in practice, the majority
abandoned that language and used Morrison as a vehicle to expand
the Court's role in Commerce Clause adjudication. Specifically, the
majority's refusal to accept Congress's findings removes from
Congress the ability to judge the relevance of its findings in relation
to economic activity.43 Thus, despite the majority's indication of a
willingness to defer to Congress's judgment in Commerce Clause
cases, the Court's actions reveal a posture that demands greater
judicial scrutiny. This posture renders many previously undisturbed
congressional regulations vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
44
37. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.
38. See id. at 1754.
39. Id. at 1752.
40. Id.
41. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Congress's findings
because they were predicated on a previously rejected causal chain of reasoning that
would impermissibly allow Congress to legislate against all violent crime. Id. at 1752-53.
In particular, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that "if accepted, petitioner's reasoning
would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact
of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption."
Id.
42. Id. at 1748.
43. The majority emphasized that "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so. Rather, whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather
than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Curt." Id. at 1752
(internal quotations omitted).
44. Notably, the Court declined to abandon Lopez's third "substantial effects"
category-an approach advocated by Justice Thomas. See id. at 1759 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). In
Lopez, Justice Thomas hinted that the majority had not gone far enough in restricting
Congress's commerce power. Lopez, 514 U.S at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). Despite
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The Fourth Circuit's decision in Gibbs v. Babbitt, therefore, comes at
a time of increasingly judicial suspicion of Congress's commerce
power.
In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit confronted a challenge to
Congress's authority to pass a regulation under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA)45 protecting red wolves as a nonessential
experimental population in North Carolina.46 Paying particular
attention to 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 and 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c),47 the
Fourth Circuit first considered the three categories of permissible
exercise of Commerce Clause power outlined by the Supreme Court
in Lopez.48 Applying Lopez's categorical framework, the court
quickly dismissed the argument that § 17.84(c) regulates a "channel
of interstate commerce" (the first Lopez category)49 The court next
concluded that the wolf is not a "thing" in interstate commerce (the
the majority's willingness to uphold congressional legislation that substantially affects
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, according to Justice Thomas, the
Commerce Clause provides Congress only the power to regulate sale and transport, rather
than businesses generally. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Justice
Thomas's view, the Constitution must be amended before Congress can control activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.
45. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. 1998). It is outside of the scope of this
Recent Development to discuss the impact of Gibbs on federal environmental legislation
as a whole. The ESA regulates enough activity however, so that any decision impacting it
would have enormous practical and political effects. For a list of all endangered and
threatened plants and animals, see U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Threatened and
Endangered Species System, at http:llecos.fws.gov/webpage (last updated Sept. 15, 2000)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
46. An experimental population is a "population of endangered or threatened species
that has been or will be released into suitable nature habitat outside the species' current
natural range." 50 C.F.R. § 17.81(a) (1999). A nonessential experimental population is
one whose loss will not likely reduce the survival of the species in the wild. 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.80(b) (1999).
47. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 487-90 (2000). The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), is the definitional and enabling provision that
authorizes the Department of the Interior to enact endangered species regulation. As part
of those regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) defines the red wolf as an experimental
population and sets strict limits on the "taking" of a wolf. the regulation essentially limits
takings to instances when human life is in danger or when livestock is being actively
pursued or killed by a red wolf. Id. Specifically, the regulation prohibits one from taking
a wolf that is merely harassing livestock. Id. (requiring evidence of "freshly wounded or
killed" livestock or pets to justify a taking of a red wolf).
48. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 490 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59
(1995)); see also supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (explaining the three Lopez
categories).
49. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 490-91 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559). The court stated that
"channels of interstate commerce" refers to navigable ways and actual interstate
movement. Id. The wolf regulation, therefore, did not fall under this category because it




second Lopez prong) simply because it has the potential to cross state
lines.5 0  Accordingly, the rest the court's analysis focused on
determining whether regulation of the red wolf in North Carolina has
a substantial effect or impact on interstate commerce (the third
Lopez prong).
In assessing whether the regulation fell into the third Lopez
category, the Fourth Circuit was initially required to determine
whether the taking of red wolves is "in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity." 52 In laundry-list fashion, the court first examined
takings by farmers and ranchers to protect their farms and
"commercially valuable livestock and crops. ' 53  Next, the court
declared that red wolves constitute part of a national tourism
industry because tourists travel to North Carolina to hear wolves
howl at night. 4 Then, the court identified a close connection
between the wolves and the interstate market of commercial
scientific research 5 Finally, the court noted the relation of the
congressional regulation to a potential renewal in the fur pelt trade.56
The court thus concluded that preserving red wolves involved
economic activity.
5 7
50. Id. at 491 (citing the Lopez court's parallel conclusion that guns were not a thing
in interstate commerce simply because they crossed state lines).
51. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491.
52. Id. at 492 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1751-52 (2000)).
Morrison affirmed the principle in Lopez that "'[w]here economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.'"
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1750 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560); see also supra text
accompanying note 36 (noting the Morrison Court's acknowledgment that Congress has
historically been denied the power to regulate non-economic intrastate activity).
53. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492 ("The protection of commercial and economic assets is the
primary reason for taking the wolves.").
54. Id. at 493-94 (relying on an unpublished study of wolf recovery in North Carolina
that concluded that northeastern North Carolina could see an increase of up to $183
million in tourism related activities).
55. Id at 494 (relying on several published and unpublished studies of the red wolf
reintroduction program as a model for other carnivore reintroduction programs).
56. Id. at 495 (relying both on a successful revival in the alligator pelt trade after
conservation efforts and on Congressional intent to revive a pelt trade in enacting the
ESA).
57. Id. at 497. In dissent, Justice Luttig claimed that the majority's conclusion that
regulation of the red wolf has economic impact is not even "arguably sustainable." Id at
507 (Luttig, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Luttig challenged the increased tourism
argument because the majority relied exclusively on an unpublished study. Id (Luttig, J.,
dissenting). Justice Luttig also challenged the scientific research ideas of the majority
because they largely relied on the generation, not the substantive conclusions, of two
articles. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting). Finally, in response to the majority argument that red
wolf regulation will inspire a renewed trade in wolf pelts, Justice Luttig pointed to the fact
that "there has not been a trade in wolf pelts since the 1800s." Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting).
2001]
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After demonstrating that the congressional regulation involved
economic activity, the court considered whether that activity was
"substantial" as defined by Morrison.8 According to the court, the
effects of each instance of wolf taking could be aggregated to
measure the magnitude of the overall economic burden. 9 In
assessing the aggregate economic impact of red wolf takings, the
court noted that "northeastern North Carolina could see an increase
of between $39.61 and $183.65 million per year in tourism-related
activities," declaring "[t]his is hardly a trivial impact on interstate
commerce."'  In other words, the economic impact of the regulated
activity was substantial enough to sustain the regulation.
While the court's conclusion that the regulation of the taking of
red wolves qualifies as a permissible exercise of Congress's
commerce power is arguably correct, it is open to criticism: 61 the
court's analysis in Gibbs is inconsistent with Lopez and Morrison in
two principal ways. First, the court relied too heavily on scientific
findings of the economic value of red wolves-an approach that cuts
against the grain of the Supreme Court's recent sweeping reform of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.62 Second, the court exhibited a
level of judicial deference to congressional findings that the Supreme
Court actively counseled against in Morrison.63
The Fourth Circuit's detailed analysis of the wolves' economic
impact is troubling for several reasons. As Justice Luttig's dissent
noted, the scientific studies upon which the majority relied were of
dubious credibility.' When compared to the substantial volume of
congressional findings supporting the Violence Against Women
Act,65 which the Supreme Court struck down in Morrison,' the
The fact that the majority and dissent disagree so fundamentally on the economic value of
the wolves demonstrates the unpredictable patchwork-type adjudication that could result
from a species-by-species analysis of economic value.
58. Il at 493.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 494.
61. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S.
Feb. 20,2001) (No. 00-844).
62. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing the specific findings in
relation to Lopez and Morrison).
63. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (analyzing the decreased role of
judicial deference in recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
64. Id. at 506-08 (Luttig, J., dissenting); see also supra note 57 (listing Justice Luttig's
criticisms of the reasoning of the Gibbs majority).
65. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1760-64 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
66. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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evidence relied on by the Gibbs majority did not present a strong
case for "substantial economic impact." Indeed, the Morrison Court
admonished that studies and findings are, by themselves, insufficient
to compel the Court to "sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation." 67  Thus, while the red wolf has an arguable
connection to interstate commerce, the Fourth Circuit majority's
primary reliance on a finding-supported, economic impact argument
questioned by the Morrison majority does not place its decision on
solid ground.6
The Gibbs majority, perhaps acknowledging the weakness of its
scientific evidence,69 explained that "[s]eparation of powers principles
mandate that [the court] leave decisions such as [red wolf regulation]
to Congress and to agencies with congressionally sanctioned
expertise and authority.... Lacking such expertise, we must decide
not whether the regulation meets with judicial favor, but whether it
passes constitutional muster. ' 70  In other words, the court did not
have to establish that the wolf has economic value (or even convince
itself that it does).71 Rather, it will uphold the statute as long as it
finds that Congress had a rational basis for connecting the regulation
to interstate commerce. 72 In fact, the court stated that it could only
invalidate the act" 'upon a plain showing that Congress exceeded its
constitutional bounds.' "73
The Gibbs majority found support for this high level of judicial
deference in the text of recent Supreme Court opinions, including
Lopez and Morrison.74 While the Supreme Court's rational basis
67. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1760-64.
68. In Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not specifically reject the importance of
congressional findings. See id. at 1751. Instead, he hinted that while they have some
relevance, they are not dispositive. See id. at 1752 ("[T]he existence of congressional
findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation.").
69. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 494 (acknowledging the critics of the tourism study).
70. IL at 498.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 490. The court acknowledged, however, that the intellectual framework is
"rational basis review with teeth." I&.
73. Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2000)).
74. E.g., Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748 ("Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate
branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a
plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds." (citing Lopez, 514
U.S. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring))); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for
a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687,703-04 (1995) ("The latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in
enforcing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its
enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's
reasonable interpretation."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) ("Since
2001]
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review has paid lip service to judicial deference in these recent
opinions,75 the thrust of Morrison revealed an approach that requires
a much more active judiciary.76 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court in Morrison referenced the strong historical
declaration of judicial authority in Marbury v. Madison77 and
explicitly advanced that Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause is not exempt from judicial oversight.78 Ultimately, by
acknowledging but dismissing the congressional findings, Chief
Justice Rehnquist used rational basis review to challenge, not defer
to, Congress's wisdom.79 Despite language to the contrary, Morrison
therefore demands that the courts not give Congress the benefit of
judicial deference but instead examine the wisdom of its judgment.8°
In contravention of the Supreme Court's activist approach in
Morrison, the Gibbs majority accepted congressional findings with
little discussion of their credibility or relevance." Indeed, the
majority stated that "[a]ssessing the relative scientific value and
commercial impact of ... red wolves is for Congress and the [Fish
and Wildlife Service], informed as they are by biologists, economists,
and others whose expertise is best delivered to the political branches,
not the courts. ' 82 In short, the deference to Congress that the Fourth
Circuit exhibited in Gibbs, while justified by some textual support, is
inconsistent with the standard established in Morrison.
[NLRB], the Court has ... undertaken to decide whether a rational basis exist[s] for
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affect[s] interstate commerce.").
75. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2000); Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 703-04 (1995); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,557 (1995).
76. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life
After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 843 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court
used rational basis review in Lopez to challenge unwise federalization of crime); Donald
H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1367, 1389-1401 (1996) (arguing
that in Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist took an activist role in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and changed the status quo that has been in place for almost sixty years).
77. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-80
(1803)). Chief Justice Rehnquist could have, of course, picked other precedent illustrating
the same point. By specifically tying Morrison to the famous case of Marbury, Justice
Rehnquist provided further evidence that he sees Morrison as an important reassertion of
lost judicial authority.
78. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748.
79. See id. at 1752.
80. For a post-Lopez insight that the Court would move in the direction of
challenging Congress's authority, see Brickey, supra note 76, at 843.
81. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493-97.
82. Id. at 495. This Recent Development does not examine the merits of the Fourth
Circuit's decision on this point, but simply argues that the decision does not follow the
Supreme Court's Morrison example of challenging congressional findings.
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Even if one accepts the Gibbs majority's conclusion that red
wolves have economic value, the court's decision fails to provide a
tenable framework for evaluating the constitutionality of other
endangered species legislation. The fact that wolves have potentially
marketable pelts and tourist-friendly behavior makes them a special
case of endangered species. Many endangered species, however, are
plants,m and while these plants may have incidental value as potential
medicinal sources,84 one cannot forcibly argue that rare plants
support a substantial interstate tourism market. Likewise, many of
the animals on the endangered species list are insects, clams, or other
animals85 whose independent commercial value is highly speculative
at best. In other words, while the Gibbs court characterized the
congressional regulation of red wolves as "but one part of the
broader scheme of endangered species legislation,"86 its lupine-
centric analysis actually makes the case an unworkable, fact-specific
opinion that undermines the sweeping reforms of Lopez and
Morrison.87
While the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Gibbs deviates from the
legal framework established by Lopez and Morrison, its conclusion-
that Congress can constitutionally protect endangered species under
the Commerce Clause-is not necessarily anomalous. Indeed, an
examination of National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt,8m in
which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion
in a manner more consistent with Lopez and Morrison, reveals how
courts can preserve federal endangered species protection while
remaining faithful to precedent.8 9
83. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife, supra note 45.
84. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/2: Serial 13020-4).
85. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife, supra note 45.
86. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493.
87. Justice Souter warned against the mare's nest of specific litigation that may arise
once the general rule of NLRB is removed. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). It seems unlikely that the current Supreme Court would
decide the landmark cases of Morrison and Lopez simply to allow circuit courts to debate
the feasibility of the wolf-pelt trade.
88. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
89. The policy question of whether Congress should legislate in this area incorporates
complex political, ecological, and economic concerns. This Recent Development does not
discuss the issue in depth. Instead, assuming arguendo that one desires to uphold ESA
regulations, this Recent Development examines the manner in which those regulations
interact with Lopez and Morrison. For a general discussion of federal versus state
environmental regulation, see generally Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the "Race-To-The-Bottom" Rationale For Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. RaV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that the traditional "race-to-the-
bottom" arguments against state environmental control are inaccurate); Richard B.
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In Home Builders, San Bernadino County challenged Congress's
protection of the Dehli Sands Flower-Loving Fly, a species whose
entire range is eight square miles in southern California.90
Specifically, the petitioners sought a declaration that Congress's
regulation of the fly under the ESA exceeded Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause.91 The D.C. Circuit upheld Congress's
authority but employed a rationale different from that of the Fourth
Circuit in Gibbs.92
The D.C. Circuit Court was unable to rely on the independent
economic value of the Dehli Sands Flower-Loving Fly to support its
holding because, unlike the red wolf, the fly has no immediate
connection to obvious economic activity such as tourism or pelt
sales.93  Instead, the D.C. Circuit relied on the government's
argument that, while the taking of any one species may or may not
have a noticeable effect on interstate commerce,94 "every species has
a place in the ecosystem. Extinction of a species can therefore have
an important effect on the larger system of which it is a part."95
Stated differently, the extinction of one species with no recognized
economic value can negatively impact other species with obvious
economic value. This "bio-diversity" argument compelled the court
to conclude that the fly's continued existence has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.96 In support of the court's conclusion that
biodiversity itself has economic value, Justice Wald observed that
medicines derived from plant and animal sources were worth fifteen
billion dollars a year in 1983!9 Justice Wald further explained that
the genetic diversity of the ecosystem protects domestic animals and
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.. 1196, 1212 (1977)
(arguing that states, left to their own devices, will lower environmental regulations in
order to attract economic development); Richard B. Stewart, The Development of
Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental
Decision Making- Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 747 (1977)
(arguing that the absence of a federal non-degradation requirement would cause states to
degrade their environment to a greater extent than they would otherwise).
90. Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1043.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1057.
93. The Dehli Sands Flower-Loving Fly also has the distinction of being the only one
of the 80,000 known species of flies to be listed as endangered under the Endangered
Species Act. Nagle, supra note 30, at 174.
94. At the time of the case, almost one-half of the domestic species listed as
endangered or threatened were found in only one state. Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052.
95. Id. at 1052 n.11.
96. Id. at 1052-54.
97. Id. at 1053.
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crops against potential genetic diseases and allows for constant
improvement and growth of these commercially valuable animals and
crops.98 In a point with particular significance for the Gibbs case,
Justice Wald explained that "[t]he traditional econometric approach,
weighing market price and tourist dollars, will always underestimate
the true value of wild species."9 9 In concurrence, Justice Henderson
stated the point even more directly: "the loss of biodiversity itself
has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and likewise on interstate
commerce."'' 1 Based on this genetic value of the biosphere as a
whole, the court found that the shrinking pool of wild species has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce as a whole.'0 '
The D.C. Circuit's explicit reliance of the interstate commercial
value of the biosphere lays the cornerstone for a rational judicial
approach to reviewing the constitutionality of endangered species
regulations.t 2 As opposed to relying on the particular nature of the
fly, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the economic value of a healthy
ecosystem,0 3 which enabled the court to state its holding with greater
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1052 n.11 (quoting EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 308
(1992)).
100. Home Builders, 130 F.3d. at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 1054.
102. One can argue that, after the Morrison decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals could utilize the Home Builders intellectual framework and arrive at a different
conclusion. Because Home Builders was decided before Morrison, it does not represent
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals post-Morrison opinion on the issue. Indeed, Morrison's
rejection of the Violence Against Women Act suggests that the Supreme Court may be
willing to challenge the bio-diversity reasoning behind the entire ESA. Home Builders,
therefore, does not represent the perfect post-Morrison adjudication of endangered
species federalism issues-it simply provides a method of reasoning that is more consistent
with recent Supreme Court precedent than the Gibbs court's reasoning.
103. A large body of literature exists concerning the economic benefits, both potential
and realized, of biodiversity. See generally DANILO J. ANTON, DIVERSITY,
GLOBALIZATION, AND THE WAYS OF NATURE 198 (1995) (arguing that the loss of
biological diversity parallels a loss of cultural knowledge about the environment). Anton
states that "human and biological diversity ... represents the bulk of the planet's natural
and human resource base; reducing diversity will result in a gradual loss of options for the
future." Id. at 198; see also ROGENE A. BUCHHOLZ, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT: THE GREENING OF BUSINESS 328-29, 331 (1993) (arguing that
"biological diversity ... is the foundation for the services [that] the ecosystem provides
and on which we and other species depend on for our existence" and that "[t]he loss of
biological diversity through species decimation is the most important process of
environmental change, because it is the only process that is wholly irreversible"); SHARON
LA BONDE HANKS, ECOLOGY AND THE BIOSPHERE: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 159
(1996) ("Ecosystems are complex and interconnected. The loss of a single species can
[have] wide ranging effects on a system."). For a thorough analysis of the effects of the
loss of a species in Australia see Australia Dep't of the Environment, Biodiversity and its
Value, at http:llwww.environment.gov.aullife/general-info/0pl.html (last modified Nov.
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conviction. In contrast, by focusing on the particular economic value
of the red wolf, the Fourth Circuit set a standard which can only be
followed by an inefficient species-by-species adjudication, ultimately
adding little to the discussion.
Not only is the D.C. Circuit's approach more manageable, the
active approach taken by the D.C. Circuit in Home Builders fits
within the general trend of Morrison. Unlike the Fourth Circuit's
judicial restraint rationale, the majority in Home Builders declared
that "in the aggregate we can be certain that a decline in bio-diversity
will have a 'real and predictable' effect on interstate commerce."" 4 In
making this determination, the court did not simply defer to
Congress's findings, but found this level of certainty itself.0 5 In other
words, the D.C. Circuit utilized a judicial rational basis approach that
reviews, rather than defers to the correctness of Congress's action.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit employed a more deferential
rational basis review-one that simply asked whether the challenged
power was "beyond the power of Congress"-declaring that "[i]t is
irrelevant whether judges agree or disagree with congressional
judgments in this contentious area."' 6 Morrison, however, demands
a rational basis review that makes judicial agreement or
disagreement with congressional judgments in contentious areas
extremely relevant."°  By deferring to congressional findings
regarding the commercial value of red wolves, the Fourth Circuit
failed to actively engage in rational basis review, following neither
the Supreme Court's lead in Morrison, nor the D.C. Circuit's
example in Home Builders.
In a post-Lopez world, environmental regulation potentially sets
the stage for recurring challenges to Congress's power to preserve
endangered species under the Commerce Clause. Recognition that
biodiversity is essential to a healthy environment, however, requires
legislators and courts to look beyond the specific environmental
impact of a species toward the commercial impact that the species
has on the environment as a whole.
For these reasons, when future courts grapple with the
constitutional limits of Congress's environmental legislation, they
19, 1997) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing that "benefits arising
from the conservation of components of biological diversity can be considered in three
groups: ecosystem services, biological resources and social benefits").
104. Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1053 n.14.
105. See id. at 1051-57 (discussing the court's basis for its conclusion).
106. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496.
107. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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should avoid the type of reasoning exhibited by the Fourth Circuit in
Gibbs. The Fourth Circuit's passive acceptance of scientific and
congressional findings is not only inconsistent with the active rational
basis review in which the Supreme Court engaged in Lopez and
Morrison, it also fails to provide a sustainable approach to
adjudicating future environmental issues. Instead, courts should look
to the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Home Builders. By taking into
account the complex commercial value of biodiversity, Home
Builders presents a defensible rationale to sustaining Congress's
authority to protect endangered species. Because the D.C. Circuit's
approach more accurately reflects the intricate nature of the
environment, it allows for intellectually consistent adjudication,
regardless of whether a particular regulation can be sustained.
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